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PERFORMANCE OF DEVELOPMENT FINANCE INSTITUTIONS 
IN KENYA: 196U-89 
I Barbara Grosh 
Abstract 
The paper examines the performance of eight parastatals which 
share the goal of fos ter ing development of one or more sectors of the 
economy primarily v ia equity participation in joint ventures with the 
private sector, or v ia loan schemes. The firms examined'include ICDC, 
DFCK, IDB, KTDC, ADC, KIE, NCC and KNTC. The paper examines the terms 
on which the parastatals have made finance available to their clients, 
the ir managerial e f f i c i e n c y , and the ir profitabil ity. The performance 
of manufacturing firms which are subsidiaries of the parastatal firms 
is compared with performance o f purely private manufacturing firms. 
The paper shows that the performance of the firms has varied widely, 
but several of the firms have made important positive contributions to 
the Kenyan capita l market, a l locat ing their investment funds to projects 
which are or average commercially viable and economically competitive. 
i 
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I . In t roduct ion 
s 
This paper w i l l d e s c r i b e arid e v a l u a t e t h e per formance o f 
e i ght publ ic e n t e r p r i s e s which s h a r e t h e g o a l o f f o s t e r i n g 
development o f one o r more s e c t o r s o f t h e economy. These e i gh t 
paras ta ta l s , termed Deve lopment F i n a n c e I n s t i t u t i o n s (DFIs ) , are 
designed p r ima r i l y t o f o s t e r d e v e l opmen t i n t h e p r i v a t e sec to r . 
The f a c t that t h e D F I s ' main g o a l i s t o f o s t e r development in the 
p r i v a t e s e c t o r makes e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e i r p e r f o r m a n c e d i f f i c u l t . 
To a r r i v e at a c o m p l e t e e v a l u a t i o n i t would be n e c e s sa r y t o 
examine the f i r m s t h e y hav e a i o e d , and e v a l u a t e t h e i r 
performance. We w i l l t a k e a t w o — f o l d app roach . 
In s ec t i on I I be l ow we d e s c r i b e t h e DF I s and t h e i r r o l e in 
the c a p i t a l markets o f Kenya . In s e c t i o n I I I we examine the 
performance o f t h e DF I s pe r s e . In s e c t i o n I l i f t we examine the 
extent t o which DFIs have s u b s i d i z e d t h e f i r m s i n which they 
invest by o f f e r i n g l ong t e rm f i n a n c e on c o n c e s s i o n a r y terms. In 
s ec t i on 11 IB we examine e f f i c i e n c y . In s e c t i o n I I I C we examine 
the record of r e t u r n s t o DF I s s h a r e h o l d e r s . 
In s e c t i on IV we t u r n t o an e v a l u a t i o n o f some o f the 
subs id i a r i e s o f t h e DF I s , t o examine how s u c c e s s f u l they have 
been at f o s t e r i n g d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g s e c t o r . We 
have a f a i r l y r i c h d a t a s o u r c e f o r exartiinir«g p a r a s t a t a l 
manufacturing s u b s i d i a r i e s . (The word s u b s i d i a r y w i l l be used t o 
ID8/WP L: i". 
i n c l u d e i n v e s t m e n t s i n which t h e DFIs hold e i t h e r a minori ty or 
m a j o r i t y o f s h a r e s . ) U n f o r t u n a t e l y we have no data on the 
p e r f o r m a n c e r e c o r d in o t h e r s e c t o r s . . > • 
I I . D e s c r i p t i o n 
. '". ••• i . . i • : i 
The DF I s have used d i v e r s e t o o l s in t h e i r corrrnon goal of 
f o s t e r i n g d e v e l opmen t , which w i l l complicate, comparison o f 
p e r f o r m a n c e i nd i ca t o r ' . . . In T a b l e 1 we l i s t the f i rms along with 
t h e i r y e a r o f i n c o r p o r a t i o n and t h e i r major t o o l s . A l l e i gh t 
p a r a s t a t a l s o f f e r c r e d i t t o p r i v a t e f i rms in the sec to r in which 
t h e y o p e r a t e . F i v e of t h e f i r m s make equ i ty investments in 
s u b s i d i a r i e s a s a way o f e n c o u r a g i n g development in t h e i r secto1--. 
( T h e s e f i v e w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o b e l ow as the holding companies.) 
T h r e e o f t h e f i r m s o f f e r e x t e n s i o n s e r v i c e s t o f i rms in t h e i r 
s e c t o r s , and t h e o t h c vs o f f e r management s e r v i c e s . Other - « 
a c t i v i t i e s a r e uviiq.uf t o one f i r m . The ADC opera tes s t a t e farms 
and manages p r i v a t e - o n e s on c o n t r a c t . The !OITC has a monopoly on 
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c e r t a i n g o o d s v-»ithin the country, and grants 
l i c e n s e s t o a g e ; , t s t o t r a d e i n t h e s e goods. The KIE operates 
i n d u s t r i a l e s t a t e s f o r s m a l l i n d u s t r i a l en t e rp r i s e s . With the 
e x c e p t i o n o f ADC's f a r m i n g a c t i v i t i e s , a l l of the major 
a c t i v i t i e s a r e g e a r e d t o e n c o u r a g i n g p r i v a t e s e c t o r a c t i v i t y . ' 
T h r e e o f t h e f i r m s h a v e a i d e d o n l y A f r i c a n entrepreneurs, whi le 
t h e o t h e r s hav? a l s o e n c o u r a g e d f o r e i g n investment. 
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TABLE 1. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATIONS 
FIRM 
YEAR OF 
INCORP. MAJOR ACTIVITIES 
Ag r i cu l tu ra l Dev. 
Corp. (ADC) 
1964 Management o f s t a t e and p r i v a t e 
f a r m s . E q u i t y and l o a n s in agro-
i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e s . 
Development Finance 
Co. of Kenya (DFCK) 
Indus t r i a l & Com-
mercial Dev. Corp 
(ICDC) 
Indus t r i a l Devel -
opment Bank (IDB) 
Kenya Indus t r i a l 
Estates (KIE) 
Kenya Nat ional 
Trading Corp (KNTC ) 
1963 E q u i t y and l o a n s i n medium and 
l a r g e s c a l e p r o j e c t s , most ly 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g . Loans t o small 
s c a l e p r o j e c t s . 
1954 E q u i t y and l o a n s i n medium and 
,. l a r g e s c a l e i n d u s t r i a l and 
c o m m e r c i a l p r o j e c t s . Loans f o r 
s m a l l s c a l e p r o j e c t s . 
1973 E q u i t y & l o a n s i n medium and l a r ge 
s c a l e i n d u s t r i a l p r o j e c t s . 
1967 O p e r a t e s i n d u s t r i a l e s t a t e s 
t h r o u g h o u t c o u n t r y . Loans to 
s m a l l I n d u s t r i a l p r o j e c t s . 
B u s i n e s s e x t e n s i o n t o smal l 
p r o j e c t s . 
1965 L i c e n s e s t r a d e r s i n c e r t a i n 
, c p m m o d i t i e s . Loans t o t r ade rs . 
O p e r a t e s d e p o t s f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n 
o f c e r t a i n c o m m o d i t i e s . 
Kenya Tour is t 
Development Corp. 
(KTDC) 
1965 E q u i t y and l o a n s i n tour i sm 
p r o j e c t s . H o t e l management. 
Nat ional Construct ion 1966 
Corporation (NCC) 
Loans and b u s i n e s s e x t e n s i o n t o 
s m a l l A f r i c a n c o n s t r u c t i o n 
f i r m s . B ids f o r p r o j e c t s f o r sub-
c o n t r a c t i n g t o s m a l l A f r i c a n 
f i r m s . 
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The c h r o n o l o g y o f t h e DF I s r e v ea l s a marked tendency toward 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r o l i f e r a t i o n and dup l i ca t i on . The f i r s t DPI wa.-
t h e I n d u s t r i a l Deve lopment Co rpo ra t i on ( IDC), s tar ted in 1954 t o 
a s s i s t and e n c o u r a g e medium and l a r ge s ca l e investment in the 
i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r . Around independence the IDC was changed t o 
t h e I n d u s t r i a l and Commerc ia l Development Corporat ion. Programs, 
w e r e s t a r t e d t o l end t o s m a l l and medium s c a l e A f r i can 
e n t r e p r e n e u r s . Around t h e same t ime the Development Finance 
Company o f Kenya was s t a r t e d w i t h the goal of lending t o medium 
arid l a r g e s c a l e i n d u s t r i a l p r o j e c t s . ICDC held equi ty in DFCh„ 
a l o n g w i t h European f o r e i g n a i d agenc ies as partners. From the 
b e g i n n i n g t h e m i s s i o n s o f ICDC and DFCK overlapped in the area o 
medium and l a r g e s c a l e p r o j e c t s . Later DFCK added small s ca l e 
l o a n s t o i t s l e n d i n g program, complet ing the dup l i ca t ion . 
A g a i n i n 1973 t h e ICDC e s t a b l i s h e d a new subsid iary whose 
r o l e would be e q u i t y and l o an p a r t i c i p a t i o n in medium and l a rge 
s c a l e i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e s — t h i s t ime the Indus t r i a l 
Deve l opment Bank. A g a i n ICDC d i d not withdraw from d i r ec t 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e s e c t o r . ICDC has funct ioned p a r a l l e l t o i t 
s u b s i d i a r y , t h e IDB, p a r t i c i p a t ing in many o f the same p ro j e c t s . 
T h e r e has a l s o been redundancy in promotion o f small scale-
e n t e r p r i s e s . ICDC has a program o f loaning t o small sca le 
c ommerc i a l v e n t u r e s , but a t t h e same time i t has a subs id iary , 
Kenya N a t i o n a l T r a d i n g C o r p o r a t i o n , which a l so has the same task 
iJb/.uJ 450 
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I CDC a l s o l o a n s t o s m a l l e n t e r p r i s e s f o r i n d u s t r i a l , machinery 
and p r o p e r t y l o a n s - I n a d d i t i o n t o these loans ICDC, s t a r t e d a 
s u b s i d i a r y i n 1367, t h e Kenya I n d u s t r i a l Es ta tes , which prov ided 
t h e same k i n d o f l o a n s t o t h e same c l i e n t e l e . In 1976 the 
o w n e r s h i p o f K IE was t r a n s f e r r e d t o the Treasury and the M in i s t r y 
o f Commerce and I n d u s t r y . Repo r t ed l y , at the t ime o f s epara t i on , 
K IE was s a d d l e d w i t h many bad loans made e a r l i e r by ICDC. ICDC 
h a s c o n t i n u e d t o l o a n i n t h e s e c t o r . 
F i g u r e 1 g i v e s t w o i n d i c a t o r s o f the importance o f the DFIs 
i n t h e c a p i t a l m a r k e t s i n Kenya. I t shows that the r o l e o f the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s i n c r e a s e d f a i r l y s t e a d i l y u n t i l 1977. By then 
p o r t f o l i o s o f t h e D F I s w e r e equa l t o almost a quar te r o f t o t a l 
c r e d i t f r o m t h e bank ing s e c t o r (commercial banks and non-bank 
f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s comb ined ) and new net investment by the 
D F I s amounted t o l"5mA o f c a p i t a l f o rmat ion in the "En t e rp r i s e s snd 
n o n — p r o f i t i n s t i t u t i o n s " s e c t o r o f the economy. 
ftfter t h e c o f f e e boom t h e r e l a t i v e importance o f the DFIs 
d e c l i n e d . The combined p o r t f o l i o o f the DFIs has hovered around 
1554 o f b a n k i n g s e c t o r c r e d i t and net investment by DFIs has been 
a round 5 * o f c a p i t a l f o r m a t i o n . 
The r o l e o f t h e D F I s has probab ly been c r u c i a l t o the 
d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e s e c t o r s i n which they p a r t i c i p a t e . They a re 
m a j o r s o u r c e s o f l o n g t e r m f i n a n c e . Commercial banks prov ide 
' IDS/WP 450 
p r a c t i c a l l y * l o a n * s u » t j » b i p f i j t tMi c a p i t a l 
investment (Paulson, page 2 4 ) . The market f o r l ong t e rm 
corporate debt i s h i g h l y u n o e r d e v e l o p e d , • w i t h o n l y s i x 'corporate 
debt instruments l i s t e d on t h e N a i r o b i S tock ' Exchange . 1 ' 
• • • , 1 1 • • \ 
The Stock Exchar.gc i t s e l f , d e a l i n g in e q u i t i e s , s l i g h t l y 
be t t e r developed, but t h e market has r ema ined t h i n and in f&'ct 
has a c tua l l y dec l ined i n t+ie pas t decade.5 I t ' i s not an 
a t t r a c t i v e source o f f i n a n c e f o r new o r f a s t g r o w i n g companies 
which des i r e t o r e t a i n most o f t h e i r e a r n i n g s f o r r e inves tmen t . 
Because the market i s s o t h i n , s t o c k h o l d e r s canno t be sur& of 
r e a l i z i n g the value o f r e t a i n e d e a r n i n g s when t h e y s e l l t h e i r 
; t* i 
stocks, so e q u i t y - p r i c e s seem t o be s e t w i t h r e s p e c t t b d iv idends 
only . 
fin example of t h i s came t o 1 i g h t ' r e c e n t l y 1 ir i ' t h e case of the 
p r o f i t a b l e Kul ia I n v e s t m e n t s L t d . The m a j o r i t y owners o f t h i k ' 
f i rm de s i r e t o r e t a i n s u b s t a n t i a l ' p o r t i o n S Of i t s e a rn ings 
in 1965) f o r r e i n v e s t m e n t , w h i l e t h e m i n o r i t y 1 s h a r e h o l d e r s haVe 
pressed f o r h igher d i v i d e n d s . The " C o n f l i 'ct Of i n t e r e s t has 
become severe enough t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s a r e Wil l i r tg 
t o buy out the m i n o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s a t ' p r i c e s two t o four ti'rties 
recent market p r i c e s f o r t h e s t o c k . 1 !';x * 1 ' " " ' ' 
Eight other f o r m e r l y p u b l i c l y t r a d e d Companies have e x i t ed 
the stock market s i n c e - IrSSOf; c u t t i r t g t h e 'number o f f i r m s traded 
. ....... . ...... .. . . . f , IDS/WP 45; 
f r om a h i g h o f 59 i n 1968. Only two f i rms went publ ic in recent 
y e a r s . J u b i l e e I n s u r a n c e L td . , in 1984 and Barclays PLC in 1986. 
Both f i r m s a r e o l d and mature, so that the c o n f l i c t over whether 
t o r e t a i n e a r n i n g s t o f i n a n c e rapid growth i s l e s s l i k e l y t o be ; 
p rob l em. For new b u s i n e s s e s or ones which are growing f a s t , the 
s t o c k market has no t p r o v i d ed an a t t r a c t i v e source of investment. 
G i v en t h e absence o f other sources of long term c r e d i t , the 
D F I s ' r o l e has p r o b a b l y been c ruc i a l t o the f i rms in which they 
have i n v e s t e d , e s p e c i a l l y those l o c a l f i rms who had no access to 
o v e r s e a s b o r r o w i n g . 
The a c c o u n t i n g c q n v e n t i o n s among paras ta ta l s make the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e accounts of the DFIs problematic. Equity 
i n v e s t m e n t s a r e g e n e r a l l y l i s t e d at cos t . Subsequent p r o f i t s or 
l o s s e s by DFI s u b s i d i a r i e s are not r e f l e c t e d In the DFIs' 
<' i i • t- •• i 
a c c o u n t s , e i t h e r i n t h e income statement or in the balance sheet 
I t i s no t c l e a r what b i a s t h i s introduces. Some of the 
s u b s i d i a r i e s have oeen h i g h l y p r o f i t a b l e and the value of the 
D F I s ' s h a r e s f a r e x c e e d s t h e i r cos t . Other f i rms have s u f f e r e d 
c h r o n i c l o s s e s , s o t h a t t h e va lue of the DFI shares i s l e s s than 
t h e i r c o s t , i n some c a s e s z e r o . Without t rack ing the accounts c 
t h e do z ens o f s u b s i d i a r i e s i t i s impossib le t o say the e f f e c t on 
t h e DFIs . 
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ICDC c a r r i e s i t s i n v e s t m e n t s a t c o s t on t h e ba l ance isheet, 
but in the notes to t h e a c c o u n t s i t g i v e s t h e market va lue f o r 
investments in f i rms quo t ed on t h e s t o c k e x c h a n g e and the, , 
d i r e c t o r s ' v a lua t i ons o f t o t a l unquoted i n v e s t m e n t s . Thff ,,, ( 
reported r e va lua t i ons have e x c e e d e d c o s t , a t l e a s t s i n c e th^ mid-
70s. For example, i n 1981 t h e d i r e c t o r s ' : . v a lua t i ons , exceeded, 
cost by 61"/. 1 This s u g g e s t s tha t ' t h e b a l a n c e s h e e t has, < < 
c ons i s t en t l y unders ta t ed t h e v a l u e o f i n v e s t m e n t s . Yet in j ; 
1978/79 the ICDC was r e q u i r e d by t h e A u d i t o r - G e n e r a l t o make much 
l a r g e r p rov i s i ons fdr J l o s s e s than i t s d i r e c t o r s had .p r e v i ous l y 
•(•[••j 
f e l t necessary, c a l l i n g i n t o : q u e s t i o n t h e d i r e c t i o n , o f b ias, i 
Throughout t h i s paper we w i l l r e l y on t h e book v a l u e s g iven f o r 
the p o r t f o l i o s , but r e f e r e n c e w i l l be made t o o t h e r poss ib l e 
r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s i f t h e p o r t f o l i o v a l u e s a r e i n a c c u r a t e . 
* 
I I I . Measures of p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e DFIs p e r s e i J , y j . , 
' ' ••'" • : • f • i ( ' . • i i f -I 
A. Terms' on wh ich DFIe i n v e s t , i 
The r o l e o f t h e DF Is i s r t o supp l y l ong- - te rm c a p i t a l in, the 
form of loans tir e q u i t y i n v e s t m e n t s . The r e c i p i e n t s , of .^his 
f inance c ons t i tu t e t h e consumers ' o f DFI g e r v i c e s x i c W e ; « i U 
examine what ra t e s o f l ' i n t # r e ' s t b r d i v i d e n d s consumers have paid 
in return f o r ! the c a p i t a l t h e y ' have r e c e i v e d f r om DFIs. , v . 
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The a v a i l a b l e da ta on r e t u r n s to the investments of the DFIs 
are p r e s e n t e d ±h F i g u r e s 2 th rough 6. In F igure 2 we compare the 
average r a t e o f r e t u r n on t h e t o t a l investment p o r t f o l i o f o r the 
f i v e h o l d i n g compan ies w i t h t h e i n t e r e s t r a t e charged by 
commercial banks. To a r r i v e a t t h e r a t e of return we added 
i n t e r e s t and d i v i d e n d s r e c e i v a b l e and d i v ided by loans plus 
equ i ty i n v e s t m e n t s . S i n c e F i g u r e 2 shows only r e a l i z e d returns 
i t p r o b a b l y u n d e r s t a t e s t h e t r u e re turns on DFI investments. 
' ' ' > '. ' . i < .• 
F i g u r e 2 shows t h a t t h e r a t e s of return on the p o r t f o l i o s of 
the f i v e h o l d i n g compan ies have v a r i e d cons iderab ly . The KTDC 
and ADC have had c o n s i s t e n t l y low returns,, though the KTDC's 
average r e t u r n has r i s e n s t e a d i l y s ince 1976. The average r a t e 
r e c e i v e d by ADC has n e v e r surpassed 5X. ; 
The ICDC, IDB, and DFCK have a l l had average returns that 
were o n l y s l i g h t l y be low t h e commercial bank lending r a t e in most 
years . In F i g u r e s 3 th rough 5 we examine t h i s in more d e t a i l . 
F i gure 3 shows t h a t s i n c e 1977 the y i e l d on IDB loans has near ly 
a lways e q u a l l e d o r e x c e e d e d commercial bank lending ra tes , but 
the y i e l d on e q u i t y has been v e r y low. On the other hand, Figure 
4 shows a d i f f e r e n t p a t t e r n f o r ICDC. From 1966 to 1980 y i e l d s 
on both l o a n s and e q u i t y approx imated commercial lending ra tes . 
S ince 1980 ICDC ' s y i e l d s on i t s loan p o r t f o l i o have continued to 
approx imate t h e c ommerc i a l bank lending ra te , whi le div idend 
y i e l d s have f a l l e n o f f . F i g u r e 5 shows an intermediate pattern 
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f o r DFCK. I t s y i e l d on l o a n s has a lways approx ima t ed commerc ia l 
bank l e n d i n g r a t e s . I t s y i e l d on e q u i t y s t a r t e d low and grew 
s l o w l y , but f r om 1977 u n t i l 1980 was comparab l e w i th i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s . I *! • I 
F i n a l l y , i n F i p u r e 6 we l o o k a t i n t e r e s t y i e l d s on the l oan 
p o r t f o l i o s o f KIE and NCC. The r e p o r t e d y i e l d s a r e e r r a t i c , bu 
a r c p r o b a b l y , on a v e r a g e , somewhat c o n c e s s i o n a r y . The KNTC's 
a ccoun ts do not p e rm i t c a l c u l a t i o n o f i t s i n t e r e s t r a t e y i e l d . 
In c o n c l u s i o n , ADC and KTDC have i n v e s t e d t h e i r p o r t f o l i o s 
i 
on h i g h l y c o n c e s s i o n a r y t e rms . I D B ' s e q u i t y i n v e s t m e n t s have 
been on h i g h l y c o n c e s s i o n a r y t e rms , but I D B ' s l o a n i n v e s t m e n t s , 
ICDC's t o t a l i n v e s t m e n t s and DFCK's t o t a l i n v e s t m e n t s <at l e a s t 
s i n c e 1977) have been on commerc i a l o r near commerc ia l t e rms. 
Loans f r om KIE and NCC have been somewhat c o n c e s s i o n a r y . 
The f i g u r e s r e p o r t e d in t h i s s e c t i o n must be I n t e r p r e t e d 
c a u t i o u s l y , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h o s e f o r r a t e s o f r e t u r n on e q u i t y . 
The prob lem a r i s e s because o f t h e c o n v e n t i o n o f r e c o r d i n g e q u i t y 
i n v e s t m e n t s a t c o s t . The a c coun t s o f t h e DFIs o n l y r e f l e c t 
d i v i d e n d income f rom s u b s i d i a r i e s , e x c l u d i n g u n r e a l i z e d c a p i t a l 
g a i n s . The v a l u e o f s u b s i d i a r i e s which have been c o n s i s t e n t l y 
p r o f i t a b l e f a r e x c e e d s t h e h i s t o r i c a l c o s t a t which t h e y a r e 
c a r r i e d on t h e DFI books . I f t h e s e s u b s i d i a r i e s a r e e a r n i n g 
r e a s o n a b l e r a t e s o f r e t u r n on t o t a l c a p i t a l i n v e s t e d , i n c l u d i n g 
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re ta ined earnings, t h e i r d i v i d e n d s can seem enormous compared 
with paid in c a p i t a l . Thus t h e r a t e s o i r e t u r n on equ i t y would 
seem to be ove rs ta ted . Y e t u n r e a l i s e d c a p i t a l g a i n s de r i v ing 
from earnings r e t e n t i o n shou ld a l s o i d e a l l y be i n c l u d e d , vhich 
means the repor ted v a l u e s may no t be o v e r s t a t e d . 
A l l of the DFI h o l d i n g compan ies have made many poor equi t 
investments. Even the ICDC, which has a f a i r l y h i g h average 
y i e l d , has never r e c e i v e d d i v i d e n d s f r om h a l f i t s s u b s i d i a r i e s 
any year, as shown in T a b l e 2. The n o t e s t o t h e accounts of a i 
of the holding companies r e v e a l t h a t some o f t h e i r subs id i a r i e s 
have jus t never taken o f f . Thus i f any o f t h e h o l d i n g companie 
had avoided making t h e s e bad i n v e s t m e n t s i t s o v e r a l l r e s u l t s 
could have been d r a m a t i c a l l y b e t t e r . 
The DFIs don ' t r o u t i n e l y p u b l i s h i n f o r m a t i o n on the d e c i s i 
making procedures behind t h e i r i n v e s t m e n t s , but l i m i t e d 
• i . 
in format ion i n d i c a t e s t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l number o f the bad 
< 
investments were made under s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n s from 
Government. The ADC r e p o r t e d in t h e i r a c c o u n t s f o r 1979/80 tha 
77X of t o t a l inves tments were made a t t h e s p e c i f i c d i r e c t i o n of 
the Min is ter of A g r i c u l t u r e , in f i r m s which s u f f e r e d l a r g e 
l osses . Correspondence f i l e s i n t h e M i n i s t r y o f F inance reveal 
that i 
n some cases t h e gove rnment d i d no t comply w i th the ADC 
Act, which prov ides t h a t where ADC u n d e r t a k e s such nonviable 
investments at government b e h e s t i t shou ld be re imbursed. 
-10-
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TABLE; 2. ICDC, RECORD OF INVESTMENTS & DIVIDENDS 
<1 r ! : . . . Number of Number paying 
Year Inves tments Dividends : 
1968 1 ' 1 ' 9 ' ' 
1969 8 1 
1970 ' 31 ' ' : 9 
1971 37 15 
1972 41 ' ' 1 5 
1973 46 15 
1974 50 18 
1975 55 17 
1976 56 1 20 
1977 59 21 
1978 59 24 
1979 60 27 
1980 ' 59 ' 26 
1981 59 19 
The KTDC p o r t f o l i o has a l s o l a r g e l y been d e c i d e d elsev/here 
than the KTDC. In r e v i e w i n g i t s o p e r a t i o n s i n 1971 t h e Treasury 
noted that "Investment d e c i s i o n s which shou ld be made by KTDC are 
o f t en made by the M i n i s t r y o f Tour ism and W i l d l i f e o r the 
Ministry of Finance and F l a n n i n g i n s t e a d . " They went on to note 
that KTDC has been sadd l ed w i th p r o j e c t s i n i t i a t e d by var ious 
m in i s t r i e s and that i t had n e v e r r e f u s e d t o t a k e o v e r such a 
p r o j e c t . Contrary to t h e KTDC A c t , KTDC was no t compensated f o r 
unviable p r o j e c t s c a r r i e d out a t gove rnment b e h e s t . 3 
Some of ICDC's wors t i n v e s t m e n t s were a l s o undertaken at the 
request, " e x p l i c i t or i m p l i c i t " o f Government . * The l im i t ed 
a v a i l a b l e in format ion s u g g e s t s t h a t i n c r e a s e d autonomy f o r the 
DFIs would probably have been a s s o c i a t e d w i t h f e w e r l o s s making 
investments. 
•>V I . ' 
B. E f f i c i e n c y 
.' '.;*.• , • .' . ' •' t , • i • 
E f f i c i e n c y i s a d i f f i c u l t c o n c e p t t o measure i n the DFI 
sec tor , s ince output i s d i f f i c u l t t o d e f i n e . I f one de f i n es the 
' • . . ' r. . . • : . ; 
mission of the DFIs as b e i n g t o manage i n v e s t m e n t p o r t f o l i o s as 
I . .' I • V. 
e f f i c i e n t l y as p o s s i b l e , one can measure e f f i c i e n c y by taking 
cos ts as a percentage o f t h e p o r t f o l i o , and t h i s i s the approach 
we have taken. To the e x t e n t t h a t t h e m i s s i o n o f DFIs d i f f e r s 
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f rom t h a t s t a t e d , t h e measure w i l l be a poor one. For example , 
„• ••>.-. j .: )'. • • •.• • *.'i i • • • : • [ • • • • •. 
i f t h e g o a l s o f t h e DFIs i n c l u d e a s s i s t i n g s m a l l l o c a l 
e n t r e p r e n e u r s or e n t e r p r i s e s l o c a t e d i n r u r a l a r e a s , t h i s would 
cause h i g h e r c o s t marg ins , but i t i s f a l s e t o i n t e r p r e t t h i s as 
l o w e r e f f i c i e n c y . 
The v a l u e o f t h e r e p o r t e d measure i s a m a t t e r o f d e g r e e . I t 
t • ""i. — i *' * 5 
i s c l e a r l y no t v a l i d f o r KIE, KNTC o r NCC, whose m i s s i o n s a r e 
much b r o a d e r than management o f i n v e s t m e n t f u n d s . For the ADC 
w i th i t s l a r g e s c a l e f a r m i n g o p e r a t i o n s i t i s p o s s i b l e because 
t h e d i r e c t c o s t s o f f a r m i n g a r e e x c l u d e d , making ADC comparab l e 
w i t h t h e o t h e r h o l d i n g compan i e s . 3 For ICDC, IDB, DFCK and KTDC, 
i t i s no t a bad measure. 
The da ta on c o s t marg ins i s p r e s e n t e d i n F i g u r e 7. The 
r e c o r d s o f t h e f i v e f i r m s va r y w i d e l y . DFCK and ICDC have 
p e r f o r m e d b e s t , w i th c o s t s running about 2-3% o f t h e p o r t f o l i o 
f r om t h e e a r l y 6 0 ' s t o t h e l a t e 7 0 ' s . Dur ing t h a t p e r i o d t h e 
c o s t s o f t h e ADC and KTDC were a p p r o x i m a t e l y t w i c e as h i gh , and 
much more v o l a t i l e . By 1977 t h e c o s t s o f t h e DFCK, IDB, ICDC and 
•i. * * * ' 
KTDC had c o n v e r g e d t o a f a i r l y narrow band, w i t h y ea r t o y e a r 
f l u c t u a t i o n s i n t h e r a n k i n g s . The ADC's c o s t s remained marked ly 
h i g h e r than a l l o t h e r f i r m s . S i n c e 1977 a l l 5 f i r m s have 
e x p e r i e n c e d an upward t r e n d i n t h e i r c o s t s . The a v e r a g e c o s t 
l e v e l f o r the f o u r low c o s t f i r m s doub l ed f r om 2. &'/. o f t h e • . I • 
p o r t f o l i o i n 1977 t o 5.4% by 1982, and t h e ADC's c o s t s 
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approx ima te l y doub l ed as w e l l . 
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h i s s t e e p increase in cost l e v e l s i s 
not a l t o g e t h e r c l e a r . I t c o u l d r e p r e s e n t a secular decrease in 
e f f i c i e n c y f o r a l l f i v e f i r m s . However, i t could r e f l e c t a 
change i n d i r e c t i o n f o r t h e f i r m s f o l l o w i n g the change in 
deve lopment p r i o r i t i e s which o c c u r r e d f o l l o w i n g the death of 
Kenyatta and t h e ascendancy o f Mo i . There i s some evidence f o r 
such a s h i f t i n o r i e n t a t i o n . For example, the DFCK began a smsL 
s ca l e i n d u s t r i e s p r o j e c t i n 1978, w h i l e i t s prev ious a c t i v i t i e s 
were c o n f i n e d t o l a r g e and medium s c a l e p r o j e c t s . However, by 
1983 s m a l l l o a n s o n l y made up 97. o f DFCK's loans outstanding. 
The KTDC has b u i l t i n n o n - t r a d i t i o n a l t o u r i s t areas (o ther than 
the Coast and N a i r o b i ) , such as Kakamega, E ldore t and Mt. Elgon. 
Two o t h e r f a c t o r s c o u l d e x p l a i n the observed cost 
e s c a l a t i o n . The measurement o f e f f i c i e n c y depends on the 
v a l u a t i o n o f t h e p o r t f o l i o . I f t h e value of the p o r t f o l i o has 
been u n d e r s t a t e d , and i f t h e d e g r e e o f understatement, has grown 
over t i m e , i t would c ause an e s c a l a t i o n such as that shown. In 
F igure 8 we hove r e c a l c u l a t e d t h e measure f o r ICDC, using the 
d i r e c t o r s ' v a l u a t i o n o f e q u i t y inves tments . I f the i r va luat ion 
i s more a c c u r a t e than book v a l u e , then most of ICDC's cost 
e s c a l a t i o n f r o m 1977 t o 1981 d i s a p p e a r s . 
The second f a c t o r which c o u l d have contr ibuted to the cos t 
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e s c a l a t i o n i s t h e g e n e r a l d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n b u s i n e s s c o n d i t i o n s . 
From 1979 t o 1983 t h e economy e x p e r i e n c e d s e v e r a l d e v a l u a t i o n s , 
f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e r a t i o n i n g , a d r o u g h t , and g e n e r a l r e c e s s i o n a r y 
c o n d i t i o n s . These c o n d i t i o n s caused raw m a t e r i a l s s h o r t a g e s , 
power i n t e r r u p t i o n s and low demand f o r t h e p r o d u c t s o f t h e 
h o l d i n g c o m p a n i e s ' s u b s i d i a r i e s . Much o f t h e h o l d i n g compan i e s 
s t a f f t i m e was d e v o t e d t o r e s c u e and r e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e i r most 
t r o u b l e d s u b s i d i a r i e s , w i t h a r e s u l t i n g i n c r e a s e i n c o s t s . 6 T'n 
d e t e r i o r a t i o n was s een abov e as a marked d e c l i n e i n r e t u r n s on 
t h e e q u i t y p o r t f o l i o s o f ICDC and DFCK. To i n t e r p r e t t h i s 
i n c r e a s e i n c o s t ma rg in s as a d e c r e a s e i n e f f i c i e n c y , i f i t was 
caused p r i m a r i l y by a h o s t i l e m a c r o - e c o n o m i c e n v i r o n m e n t would 
m i s l e a d i n g . 
W h i l e i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o s o r t ou t t h e d e g r e e o f t h e i r 
i n f l u e n c e , i t seems l i k e l y t h a t a l l t h e s e f a c t o r s were a t work . 
The DFIs p r o b a b l y t u r n e d t o w a r d i n v e s t m e n t s which had h i g h e r 
s u p e r v i s i o n c o s t s , p r o b l e m s w i t h i n f l a t i o n a c c o u n t i n g p r o b a b l y 
mean t h a t t h e r e p o r t e d f i g u r e s o v e r s t a t e t h e phenomenon. Macro 
e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s have p r o b a b l y caused d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n 
p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e D F I s ' i n v e s t m e n t s , c a u s i n g i n c r e a s e d 
s u p e r v i s i o n c o s t s . And t h e r e may w e l l have been a d e c r e a s e i n 
e f f i c i e n c y s i n c e t h e c o f f e e boom. 
T a b l e 3 p r o v i d e s f i g u r e s on a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o s t s f r o m DF Is 
i n o t h e r A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s , f o r c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h e d a t a i n 
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TABLE 3. ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES AS '/. OF AVERAGE TOTAL ASSETS 
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F i g u r e 7. The Kenyan DFIs seem t o be i n l i n e w i th DFIs 
e l s e w h e r e . The d e f i n i t i o n s used i n F i g u r e 7 and T a b l e 3 d i f f e r 
somewhat, i n a f a s h i o n which causes t h e Kenyan DFIs t o s u f f e r i n 
t h e compar i son . We have compared a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o s t s w i th t h e 
i n v e s t m e n t p o r t f o l i o , e x c l u d i n g f i x e d a s s e t s . In T a b l e 3 
' i . . i • i i . . : . ; f . . . : . 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e e xpenses a r e compared w i t h t o t a l a s s e t s . 
C. P r o f i t a b i l i t y 
; r 
The r a t e s o f r e t u r n on i n v e s t m e n t i n t h e DFIs a r e shown i n 
F i g u r e s 9 and 10. F i g u r e 9 shows t h e r a t e s o f r e t u r n f o r t h e 
h o l d i n g companies . On t h e who le t h e r a t e s have been low, se ldom 
s u r p a s s i n g 10'/.. The KTDC has c l e a r l y been t h e wors t p e r f o r m e r , 
l o s i n g money e v e r y y e a r up u n t i l 1976 when i t f i n a l l y c r e p t above 
t h e 11 ne. The ADC showed s t e a d y improvement f r om i t s d i sma l 
b e g i n n i n g s up u n t i l t h e e a r l y 7 G ' s . Dur ing t h e 7 0 ' s i t s r a t e o f 
r e t u r n hove red in t h e ne i ghbo rhood o f 4-5%, and then d i s a p p e a r e d 
• I \ 
i n t h e 8 0 ' s . The DFCK has g e n e r a l l y had t h e h i g h e s t r e t u r n s , 
though a t 5-10% they cannot be c o n s i d e r e d h i g h . ICDC and IDB 
have r e p o r t e d s m a l l p o s i t i v e r e t u r n s . 1 
F i g u r e 10 shows t h e r a t e s o f r e t u r n f o r t h e o t h e r t h r e e 
f i r m s . KNTC has heen m o d e r a t e l y p r o f i t a b l e , i n t h e 5-10% r a n g e 
du r ing much o f t h e p e r i o d . Both KIE and NCC have been h i g h l y 
u n p r o f i t a b l e , t h e NCC l o s i n g ae much as 30% a n n u a l l y . These 
IJS'/wP 450 

f i g u r e s are perhaps a n i t m i s l e a d i n g . Because o f t h e extension 
s e r v i c e nature of K1S and hiCG i t v a s n e v e r e x p e c t e d tha t they 
would make p r o f i t s or e v en b r eak e v en . Each r e c e i v e s an annual 
grant from the government t o c o v e r c o s t s , and they have l i v e d 
within t h e i r incomes. 
The r a t e s of r e t u r n e a rned by t h e DFIs have been toe low 10 
tliem to have s e l f - f i n a n c e d g r o w t h . T h i s e x p l a i n s t h e i r f a i l u r e 
to pay d iv idends. I t a l s o n-.eans t h a t t h e f i r m s depend on 
government l o r annual i n c r e a s e s .Ln t h e i r c a p i t a j base , a 
condi t ion which has p r o b a b l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e i r l a c i . o i 
autonomy in investment d e c i s i o n s . 
IV. Performance of I l a n u f s c t u r i n g S u b s i d i a r i e s o f DFIs 
In 1S80 Hopcra f t and O-^uttu a t t e m p t e d t o compare the 
performance of raanufacturing f l i m e i n which t h e DFIs have 
Invested with other , p u r e l y p r i v a t e , mar iu fac tur ing f i r m s . Their 
conclusions were damning. In t h i s s e c t i o n we p r e s e n t new data 
which con t rad i c t s t h e i r c o n c l u s i o n s . 
Hopcraft and O g u t t u ' a c o n c l u s i o n s were s t r o n g , and we quote 
them at length here: 
This paper s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e p a r a s t a t a l investment 
companies nave done l i t t l e o r n o t h i n g t o push the 
manufacturing s e c t o r i n t h e d i r e c t i o n s s p e c i f i e d by the 
po l i c y s tatements o f g o ve rnment . R a t h e r , they appear t o 
have aided and a b e t t e d some o f the l e a s t a p p r o p r i a t e 
f e a tu r e s of the Kenyan i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e . The paras taU 
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c l i e n t f i r m s t end t o be l a r g e , c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e , impor t 
i n t e n s i v e and a lmos t e x c l u s i v e l y o r i e n t e d toward a 
p r o t e c t e d , o v e r p r i c e d l o c a l market . The p a r a s t a t a l s have 
conce rned t h e m s e l v e s a lmos t e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h the f i n a n c i a l 
w e l l - b e i n g o f t h e i r c l i e n t f i r m s . . . 
F i rms a r e : uicic t o p e r c e i v e t h e i r o p t i m a l s t r a t e g y as 
i n v o l v i n g Government f i n a n c i a l l y as much as p o s s i b l e and 
then us ing t h a t i n v o l v e m e n t t o e x t r a c t f u r t h e r c o n c e s s i o n s 
which then have t h e appearance o f b e i n g i n t h e Government '? , 
i n t e r e s t . When Government o r a p a r a s t a t a l has s u b s t a n t i a J. 
h o l d i n g s i n a commerc ia l f i r m i t i s not easy f o r Government 
o f f i c i a l s t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e between t h e i n t e r e s t s o f that-
f i r m on t h e one hand, i n s e e k i n g r e n t s and t r a n s f e r s t o 
i t s e l f , and t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e economy on t h e o t h e r where 
such r e n t s and t r a n s f e r s may no t r e p r e s e n t r e a l economic 
b e n e f i t s . 
F i nanci& 1 p a r t i c i p a t i o n by government ( o r p a r a s t a t a l ) 
has i n Kenya become t h e b e s t g u a r a n t e e o b t a i n a b l e t h a t a 
f i r m w i l l make h i gh and s e c u r e f i n a n c i a l p r o f i t s regardless- , 
o f i t s economic e f f i c i e n c y o r i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s . I t i s t h e key e l emen t f o r e n t r y i n t o what 
has been c a l l e d t h e " c o r p o r a t e a r i s t o c r a c y " i n Kenya. 
Membership o f t h i s a r i s t o c r a c y v i r t u a l l y ensu r e s t h a t t h e 
f i r m i n v o l v e d w i l l be on t h e r i g h t s i d e o f t h e 
d i s c r i m i n a t i n g s o r i e s o f measures that, government uses t o 
promote manu fac tu r ing a c t i v i t y . 7 
We s u g g e s t t h a t H o p c r a f t and Ogut tu o v e r s t a t e d t h e i r c a s e 
and drew c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t went f a r beyond what t h e i r da ta c o u l d 
s u p p o r t . T h e i r data shows c l e a r l y t h a t l a r g e r f i r m s were more 
l i k e l y than sraaJler f i r m s t o have government p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and 
t h a t government owned f i r m s t ended t o be more c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e 
than p r i v a t e f i r m s . T h i s a l o n e d o e s n ' t j u s t i f y t h e i r s t r o n g 
c o n c l u s i o n s . h o p c r a f t and Oguttu had no a c c e s s t o d i r e c t 
measures o f c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s o r e f f i c i e n c y . They had no way o f 
knowing whether p a r a s t a t a l s were more p r o t e c t e d than p r i v a t e 
f i r m s , and they had no e v i d e n c e o f a v e r a g e r a t e s o f p r o t e c t i o n t. 
a l l . Hence t h ? i r c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t t h e p a r a s t a t a l h o l d i n g 
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companies have " a i d e d and a b e t t e d some o f t h e l e a s t a p p r o p r i a t e 
f e a t u r e s o f t h e Kenyan i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e " s e ens t o be based on 
the b e l i e f t h a t c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y must be bad. We tu rn now t o ar. 
e xam ina t i on o f new data which s t r o n g l y c o n t r a d i c t s t h e i r 
c o n c l u s i o n s . 
. I i' 
("i ' • i- i r j 
During 1985 a s tudy o f t h e manu fac tu r ing s tudy .in Kenya was 
c a r r i e d out under the d i r e c t i o n o f the T r e a s u r y and the M i n i s t r y 
o f Commerce and I n d u s t r y by D o r i s Jansen and M i c h a e l S e l h o r s t . 
* •• . i:ri 
The s tudy c o v e r e d i n d e t a i l t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f 77 manu fac tu r ing 
f i r m s du r ing 1984. I n t e r v i e w s were conduc t ed w i t h management and 
each f i l l e d out a 17 page q u e s t i o n n a i r e which asked f o r -..(_• j,. -» . -3. < T - : . ; j lifil '/.,!i.vl : ; . /'J O-JmIVC- .' '. i-, f . 
i n f o r m a t i o n on r e v enue , c o s t s and c a p a c i t y u t i l i z a t i o n . R e s u l t s • • I ••:•< • -Ifii i ? 
o f t h e su r v e y were made a v a i l a b l e t o t h e au thor on a d i s a g g r e g a t e 
b a s i s . From t h i s su r v e y we can c a l c u l a t e nominal and e f f e c t i v e 
r a t e s o f p r o t e c t i o n and d o m e s t i c r e s o u r c e c o s t s , as w e l l as 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y . T h i s s u r v e y g i v e s more a c c u r a t e measures o f 
e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n than p r e v i p u s s t u d i e s , s i n c e i t uses a c t u a l 
domes t i c p r i c e s compared w i th c . i . f . wor ld p r i c e s . P r e v i o u s 
/ i'j i t . * , 
s t u d i e s r e l i e d on t a b l e s o f i m p o r t d u t i e s and thus d i d no t 
a c c u r a t e l y i n c l u d e t h e e f f e c t o f impor t bans o r quo ta s o r f o r e i g n 
; • • • ' * 1 •; '-M i 
exchange r e s t r i c t i o n s on e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n . 8 
• « .• . '.• . ' r'.: i i • 
1 ./".•:.:•> i • -p. .. . • • i- ;w 
The sample o f 77 f i r m s c o v e r e d about 33% o f t h e ne t ou tpu t 
and 28% o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g employment. About one q u a r t e r o f ICDC':." 
s u b s i d i a r i e s a r e c o v e r e d , f e w e r f o r IDB and DFCK. The sample i s 
° IDS/WP 4>-' 
b i a s e d i n f a v o r o f f i r m s wh i ch p e r f o r m e d s a t i s f a c t o r i l y , t o r t h e 
e x t e n t t h a t i t c o v e r e d o n l y f i r m s ' i n ope ra t i oh , and a few 
s u b s i d i a r i e s o f t h e D F I s have c o l l a p s e d . This b ias a p p l i e s as 
w e l l t o m a n u f a c t u r i n g f i r m s wh i ch a r e pure ly p r i v a t e . 
The d e f i n i t i o n s used i n t h i s s e c t i o n are s l i g h t l y :i 
u n c o n v e n t i o n a l , and d e s e r v e comment. We ( f o l l o w i n g Hopcra f t an'.' 
O g u t t u ) have c l a s s i f i e d as p a r a s t a t a l any f i r m in which- One o i 
' i ! ••••••!<••,-••: IU. • . . 1. . ,.. ; , , . 
t h e D F I s h o l d s some e q u i t y , be i t m i n o r i t y , m a j o r i t y or1 t o t a l 
r ! '»' ' hi.is n itij - i • : 
o w n e r s h i p . Most o f t h e D F I s ' i n v e s t m e n t s are j o i n t ventures w:i 
' ' '•*'•'*•>•' ' "• ' •'• ••»••• • ' i.< ••..•: •• ] ' . J...J-, ... 
p r i v a t e p a r t n e r s most o f wh i ch a r e f o r e i g n f i rms . Thus some o i 
.'-•nyti:'-.ii-han-jfi .'i.'i.cv/ t •• •<••••• • •• . - , • > 
t h e f i r m s c l a s s i f i e d h e r e as p a r a s t a t a l s have the m a j o r i t y 'of 
t h e i r s h a r e s owned by m u l t i n a t i o n a l s , and these f i rms a l so di"'av 
• . O i .i ' . i. • • I i • : j . :.;..- '"•.••.,••., •..,-.. ... ..-...., 
t h e i r t o p management f r o m t h e i r p a r e n t f i rms . The reason f o r 
u s i n g t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s t h a t we w i sh t o e va lua t e the 
: I »: n i ,... i . . : ; . . ,, 
c o n t r i b u t i o n o f t h e DF Is by e x a m i n i n g the p o r t f o l i o of 
• .A * f * . . I I j _ .. 
i n v e s t m e n t s t h e y have c h o s e n . We compare s e v e r a l aspec ts of 
p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e f i r m s i n wh ich t h e DFIs have inves ted with 
p e r f o r m a n c e o f f i r m s i n wh ich t h e y h a v e n ' t i n ves t ed . We assume 
t h a t i f f i r m s i n wh i ch D F I s h a v e i n v e s t e d have performed be t t e r 
than f i r m s i n wh ich t h e y have n o t , then at l e a s t one can conc i u s ' • • • • '' O U i I •!-.„.., . t h a t t h e DF Is h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d t o a l l o c a t i n g c a p i t a l ' t o v i a b l e 
. ; ' . . . . . . 
i n d u s t r i e s , and p o s s i b l y t h e D F I s have a l s o c on t r i bu t ed '' 
p o s i t i v e l y t o e f f i c i e n t management i n the manufacturing s e c t o r . 
'i'. .. ; , . . . . . . If" > . I V I.D J.< •;.•,.. .IT 
I . , . r 1 • t - •>.•.:. 
The m a n u f a c t u r i n g f i r m s which are p a r t i a l l y Owned by DFIs 
' ll • , t ; i. a r e on a v e r a g e more e f f i c i e n t and l e s s p r o t e c t ed than 
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manufacturing f i rms w i t h no p u b l i c o w n e r s h i p . The d a t a which 
supports t h i s s u r p r i s i n g c o n c l u s i o n i s shewn i n T a b l e 4. Data 
are presented on four s e p a r a t e measures o f p e r f o r m a n c e , and each 
w i l l be discussed be low. Data a r e f i r s t p r e s e n t e d i n Table 4 f o r 
a l l i ndus t r i e s t o g e t h e r , and a r e then broken down by indus t ry in 
l a t e r t ab l es . 
In Table 4, column I shows t h e nomina l p r o t e c t i o n 
c o e f f i c i e n t (NPC). T h i s i s t h e r a t i o be tween t h e domes t i c p r i c e 
f o r a f i r m ' s output and t h e c . i . f . p r i c e f o r a c omparab l e 
imported good or the f . o . b. p r i c e f o r an e x p o r t a b l e good . Vaiuc-s i 
over one i nd i ca t e tha t d o m e s t i c m a n u f a c t u r e r s can s e l l t h e i r • * i i v. 
goods at i n f l a t e d p r i c e s due t o i m p o r t r e s t r i c t i o n s such as 
t a r i f f s or import bans. The t a b l e shows t h a t t h e manufacturing 
paras ta ta l s enjoyed, on a v e r a g e , a 13% premium o v e r wor ld p r i ces 
f o r t h e i r produce, w h i l e p r i v a t e m a n u f a c t u r e r s e n j o y e d a 16% 
premium. Within the p a r a s t a t a l s , DFCK s u b s i d i a r i e s had much l e s s 
p ro tec t i on <in f a c t n e g a t i v e ) f o r t h e i r o u t p u t s than d id 
subs id i a r i e s of ICDC and IDB. 
'1' 1 i i • 
The second measure o f p e r f o r m a n c e I s t h e E f f e c t i v e 
P ro t ec t i on C o e f f i c i e n t (EPC >. The EPC i s t h e b e s t measure of 
whether t rade p o l i c i e s c r e a t e an i n c e n t i v e or d i s i n c e n t i v e f o r 
l o ca l production. The EPC e x p l i c i t l y a c c o u n t s f o r t h e f a c t that 
e f f e c t i v e p ro t e c t i on may be l o w e r than nomina l p r o t e c t i o n , i f the 
ra t e of t a r i f f s on i n p u t s i s l o w e r than t h a t on o u t p u t s . 
-.54-
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TABLE 4. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE IN MANUFACTURING FIRMS 
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1. 13 1. 10 
TOTAL PARASTATALS 
A v e r a g e 
A v e r a g e , i f c a p a c i t y u t i l i z a t i o n were 100/'.: 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
Minimum . 89 .36 
Maximum 1.76 10.31 
A v e r a g e 1 .16 1.22 
Number q f f i r m s = 42 
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S imi l a r l y , the r a t e o f e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n may. be h igher than 
nominal p ro tec t i on i f t h e a v e r a g e r a t e o f t a r i f f s on inputs i s 
lower than on outputs, The EPC. i s t h e r a t i o o f v a l u e added at 
domestic o r i c e s to v a l u e added ; a t w o r l d p r i c e s . The EPC measures 
the degree t o which f a c t o r c o s t s ( l a b o r , r e n t , i n t e r e s t ) f o r the 
s tage of production b e i n g done i n Kenya can e x c e e d f a c t o r cos ts 
f o r that s tage of p r o d u c t i o n e l s e w h e r e v/hile t h e goods remain 
compet i t i ve on the l o c a l market . An EPC o f 1 r e p r e s e n t s no 
e f f e c t i v e p ro t ec t i on , w h i l e an EPC g r e a t e r than . one represent^ 
p o s i t i v e e f f e c t i v e . p r o t e c t i o n . A v e r y h i g h l y p r o t e c t e d f i rm pan 
produce nega t i ve va lue added a t w o r l d p r i c e s , and w i l l have a 
negat ive EPC. , , , 
Table 4 shows t h a t t h e a v e r a g e EPC f o r , p a r a s t a t a l 
manufacturing concerns was l ow , . 1 , 1 0 . T h i s c o n t r a s t s with the 
p r i va t e sec to r , which had an EPC o f . 1 . 22 . In o t h e r words, 
p r i va t e manufacturers c o u l d o p e r a t e w i t h f a c t o r c o s t s up to, 227. 
higher than f o r e i g n p r o d u c e r s and s t i l l f i n d a market f o r t h e i r 
goods in Kenya. P a r a s t a t a l f i r m s , on t h e o t h e r hand, had lower 
e f f e c t i v e p ro t ec t i on . ,, • 
'' • ! " I. • • • :> ,. .1. . . ; ,: 
The th i rd measure o f p e r f o r m a n c e i s t h e Domes t i c Resource 
Cost r a t i o (DRC). The DRC r a t i o i s t h e r a t i o , o f domest i c f a c t o r 
costs at s o c i a l p r i c e s t o va lue , added a t s o c i a l p r i c e s . , A DRC 
l ess than one i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e r e i s more, v a l u e added than-
resources consumed, and t h e f i r m makes e f f i c i e n t use of 
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r e s o u r c e s . A DRC g r e a t e r than one i n d i c a t e s t h a t more1 r e s o u r c e s 
were consumed by p r oduc ing l o c a l l y than v a l u e was added by l o c a l 
p r o d u c t i o n . In such c a s e s l o c a l p r o d u c t i o n i s more o f a d r a i n ..-n 
t h e economy than i m p o r t i n g t h e p roduc t would be. An e x t r e m e l y 
i n e f f i c i e n t f i r m w i l l have a n e g a t i v e DRC, s i n c e v a l u e added a t 
s o c i a l p r i c e s w i l l be n e g a t i v e . 
T a b l e 4 showt; t h a t manu fac tur ing p a r a s t a t a l s a r e somewhat 
i n e f f i c i e n t (DRC b f 1 . 2 2 ) • w h i l e p r i v a t e man u fa c t u r e r s a r e more 
i n e f f i c i e n t > t'D«C o f ' 1 . 4 1 ) ; Among' t h e p a r a s t a t a l s / ICDC' s 
s u b s i d i a r i e s d id ' much b e t t e r (DRC o f 1 . 0 6 ) than d i d t h o s e o f ID; 
( 1 . 9 6 ) o r DFCK ( 1 . 3 3 ) . - ; : 
The f i n a l measure o f p e r f o r m a n c e shown i n T a b l e 4 i s 
f i n a n c i a l r a t e o f r e t u r n . T h i s i s measured as t o t & l r e t u r n s t o 
c a p i t a l ( i n c l u d i n g i n t e r e s t c o s t 'and p r o f i t s ) d i v i d e d by t h e 
r e p l a c e m e n t c o s t o f c a p i t a l . P a r a s t a t a l f i n a n c i a l r e t u r n s f e l l 
w i t h i n a nar rower band than p r i v a t e f i r m s ' r e t u r n s . The l e a s t 
p r o f i t a b l e p a r a n a t a l d i d n ' t do as bad l y as t h e l e a s t p r o f i t a b l e 
p r i v a t e f i r m . The most p r o f i t a b l e p r i v a t e f i r m d i d c o n s i d e r a b l y 
b e t t e r than the most p r o f i t a b l e p a r a s t a t a l . O v e r a l l t h e a v e r a g e 
r a t e o f r e t u r n f o r p a r a s t a t a l s and p r i v a t e f i r m s Was v e r y 
s i m i l a r i 11. IX and 10. 3X. r e s p e c t i v e l y I t seems t h a t pa r - as t a t a j s 
show nar rower v a r i a n c e i n p r o f i t r a t e s than t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r , 
but t h e means appear t o be e q u a l . • ' 
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To summarize t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f manu fac tu r ing p a r a s t a t a l s : 
Consumers have p a i d somewhat e l e v a t e d p r i c e s f o r t h e p r o d u c t s oi" 
t h e s e f i r m s , i n the r ange o f 137. more than f o r compe t ing i m p o r t s . 
However , t h e manu fac tu r ing p a r a s t a t a l s have a l s o p a i d . p r i c e s . f o r 
i n p u t s t h a t were e l e v a t e d . The r e s u l t i s t h a t manu fa c tu r ing 
p a r a s t a t a l s have e x p e r i e n c e d a v e r a g e e f f e c t i v e r a t e s o f 
p r o t e c t i o n i n t h e r ange o f 10'/.. In c o n t r a s t , p r i v a t e f i r m s have 
e n j o y e d a s p r e a d between t a r i f f s on t h e i r o u t p u t s and i n p u t s , 
!•->.. . ' I '.I 
g i v i n g them on a v e r a g e t w i c e t h e a v e r a g e e f f e c t i v e r a t e o f 
p r o t e c t i o n , around 22%. A v e r a g e p r o f i t r a t e s were about e q u a l 
f o r p a r a s t a t a l s and p r i v a t e f i r m s . 
., . . . .... • u -p -I '.. .. ! • \ U r "i 
Wh i l e manu fac tu r ing p a r a s t a t a l s have not been .h i gh l y ! ; • .••,.. 11V" 
p r o t e c t e d , they have been somewhat i n e f f i c i e n t , as shown by an 
a v e r a g e DRC o f 1 .22 . In l a r g e p a r t t h i s i n e f f i c i e n c y stems f r om 
low c a p a c i t y u t i l i z a t i o n d u r i n g t h e y e a r o f t h e s t u d y ; 1984 saw 
low consumer demand due t o d r ouqh t . C a p a c i t y u t i l i z a t i o n . «w i.» v . t.x. ' - * —-s'1 -•* ,'rn. n ' nr. n f l r r 
a v e r ag ed 88% among m a n u f a c t u r i n g p a r a s t a t a l s ,and 75% among 
1 '• ' . 1 '•' 'rt'-'l ' f t KO »• •«• •/ '•' 'I'1'-..- i •• ...'•)?<•: ' 
p r i v a t e m a n u f a c t u r e r s . T h i s e x c e s s c a p a c i t y r e s u l t e d i n h i g h e r 
' : • • < J • i •x,:') ' i i r • •rr.~>'" • " • ,T< 
u n i t c o s t s , which shows up in our- measures as a h i gh DRC. I f 
c a p a c i t y u t i l i z a t i o n had been 100% among manufac tur ing , .:••!., , ; :> Din • O 
p a r a s t a t a l s , a v e r a g e DRC would have f a l l , e n t o . 9 5 . In o t h e r 
words, t h e s o u r c e o f t h e i r i n e f f i c i e n c y i n 19S4 was, r e d u c e d 
O i .it. ii i • ' 11 • i <ir.n,.n. •>• .. 
ou tpu t . P r i v a t e m a n u f a c t u r e r s s u f f e r e d even l o w e r a v e r a g e 
c a p a c i t y u t i l i z a t i o n than d i d p a r a s t a t a l f i r m s , which a c coun t ed 
f o r t h e i r g r e a t e r i n e f f i c i e n c y . I f c a p a c i t y u t i l i z a t i o n , jwere,. , 
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100% the p r i v a t e m a n u f a c t u r e r s would have an average DRC of . 93. 
From t h e a v a i l a b l e d a t a , we can conclude that the 
s u b s i d i a r i e s i n which DFIs have invested have done qu i t e we l l or, 
s e v e r a l c oun t s , i n e v e r y c a s e be t t e r on average than purely 
p r i v a t e l y owned m a n u f a c t u r e r s . They have so ld goods at p r i c e s 
only modes t l y e l e v a t e d above world l e v e l s . They have funct ioned 
with modest e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n . During years when demand i s 
h igher they p roduce e f f i c i e n t l y . 
• • . ., .. .. ;. i - ' • •. 
When compar ing pe r f o rmance of f i rms wi th in an industry , do 
p a r a s t a t a l s s t i l l p e r f o r m b e t t e r than p r i v a t e f i rms? Or, when 
compared w i t h i n i n d u s t r i e s , do paras ta ta l s do worse? In the 
l a t t e r c a s e t h e b e t t e r o v e r a l l performance could only have been 
1 • .M l ' • ' . . ' ' ' I •/>•• • 
ach ieved i f p a r a s t a t a l s managed on average t o inves t in more 
,;; .«,"•••* | I • • . • . I i • ; • . 
v i a b l e s e c t o r s than has t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r . We turn our 
a t t e n t i o n now t o compar ing performance within indus t r i es . We 
seek t o d i s t i n g u i s h be tween two a l t e r n a t i v e v iews: that , . i, • , i p a r a s t a t a l s a r e i n e f f i c i e n t and protec ted , both in absolute terms 
• 
and r e l a t i v e t o t h e p r i v a t e sec to r , and that which emerged from 
Table 4, t h a t p a r a s t a t a l s are l e s s pro tec ted and more e f f i c i e n t 
than p r i v a t e f i r m s . With some except ions, we f i nd that the 
c o n c l u s i o n s f r om T a b l e 4 remain v a l i d . 
; 1 . i . • . . 
T a b l e 5 shows t h e a v e rage l e v e l s of the four performance 
i n d i c a t o r s , c l a s s i f i e d by industry and by type of ownership. An 
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TABLE 5. AVERAGE MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE, 
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BY INDUSTRY & OWNERSHI: 
i X of V/. in 
INDUSTRY NPC EPC. Dj?C_ ROR S^ig^f .i I • rji 
1. PAPER & PACKAGING 
Paras ta ta l s . 8 6 . 7 1 1 . 6 9 2.37. 12.7'/. 
P r i v a t e 1 . 06 . 8 2 . 84 14.07. 2.0'. 
2. WOOD & FURNITURE 
Paras ta ta l s . 97 . 86 . 97 8.37. 0.'47 
P r i v a t e 1 . 01 . 7 0 . 94 missing missinc 
3. FOOD PROCESSING 
Paras ta ta l s 1 .08 1 .04 . 87 20. 77. 24. '-J\ 
Pr i va t e 1.04 . 9 8 1 . 51 5.57. 8.&V-I • :" i:. ..« I , . • i . • . .1 . , .!, '•' : J' 
4. BEVERAGES & TOBACCO 
Paras ta ta l s . 9 8 . 96 . 81 20.2% : v 1,4V. 




Paras ta ta l s .1.32 1 .47 1 . 0 4 " '' 25.57. 10. 4 •;. 
P r i v a t e 1 .07 . 9 1 . 9 9 9.87. 8 . 
6. TEXTILES 
Paras ta ta l s 1 . 28 1 . 3 0 1 .65 7.57. ,..."7, 
P r i v a t e 1. 73 7 . 1 7 16 .56 0.67. 13. 77. 
7. CLOTHING, FOOTWEAR, OTHER TEXTILE 8. LEATHER PRODUCTS 
Paras ta ta l s 1 .11 . 6 2 2. 68 A . 57. 1 
P r i v a t e 1 .36 1 .51 1 .00 35.77. 6.97. 
• " ' M ' '' ;. .., .m . • , ) , 
8. METAL & METAL PRODUCTS 
Paras ta ta l s 1 .09 1 . 05 1 . 7 1 4.97. 1.87. 
P r i v a t e 1 .36 2 . 6 9 5 . 2 0 3.77. l.'-v; 
: •  • • • . . i ' • 
9. NON-METALLIC MINERALS 
Paras ta ta l s . 91 . 8 8 1 .30 2157. 4/. 
P r i v a t e 1 . 2 2 2 . 0 5 2 . 0 5 12.87. 0.7/ 
10. ELECTRICAL & TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT fi J1ISC. MANUFACTURES 
Paras ta ta l s 1 . 4 2 2 . 0 3 1.85' 36.27. '1.37. 
P r i v a t e 1 .44 6 . 2 1 4 . 1 6 33.77. 0.07. 
TOTAL 100, 07 
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examinat ion o f T a b l e 5 r e v e a i s t h a t pa ras ta ta l s have lower ra t e s 
of e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n than p r i v a t e f i rms in the same industry 
grouping i n seven o f t h e t e n i n d u s t r i e s . In Table 6 we rank the 
i n d u s t r i e s f rom t h e l e a s t p r o t e c t e d to the most protec ted . I t i s 
shown in T a b l e & t h a t 2 o f t h e 3 i n d u s t r i e s in which paras ta ta l s 
have g r e a t e r e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n than p r i v a t e f i rms are 
i n d u s t r i e s which have v e r y low o r n e g a t i v e ra t es . In other 
words, t h e s e a r e i n d u s t r i e s where p a r a s t a t a l s are s t i l l 
unpro t ec t ed , and so a r e more c o n s i s t e n t with the g ene ra l i z a t i ons 
of Tab l e 4 than t h e v i e w t h a t p a r a s t a t a l s are in general 
i n e f f i c i e n t . The c h e m i c a l i n d u s t r y i s the only industry where 
p a r a s t a t a l s e n j o y e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n which i s both substant ia l 
in a b s o l u t e t e rms and g r e a t e r than p r i v a t e f i rms r e c e i v e . 
In a d d i t i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t w i th in each industry 
p a r a s t a t a l s a r e g e n e r a l l y l e s s p r o t e c t e d than p r i v a t e i i rms, 
p a r a s t a t a l i n v e s t m e n t i s more concen t ra t ed in the indus t r i e s with 
lower p r o t e c t i o n . T a b l e 7 shows t h a t GO. 47. o f the investments in 
f i rms in which p a r a s t a t a l s p a r t i c i p a t e are in indus t r i e s with 
e s s e n t i a l l y no o r n e g a t i v e e f f e c t i v e p ro t e c t i on , whi le only 31.7V. 
of p r i v a t e c a p i t a l i s i n t h o s e i n d u s t r i e s . Both pa ras ta ta l s and 
p r i v a t e f i r m s have a l l o c a t e d about 307. of c a p i t a l to i ndus t r i e s 
with modera te r a t e s o f e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n . Pa ra s t a t s l s have 
i n v e s t e d on l y 10% o f t h e i r c a p i t a l in i ndus t r i e s with high r a t e s 
of p r o t e c t i o n , w h i l e 38.6% o f p r i v a t e c a p i t a l i s in h ighly 
p r o t e c t e d i n d u s t r i e s . T h i s o f f e r s strong r e f u t a t i o n t o Hopcraft 
-41-.. 
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TABLE 6. INDUSTRIES RANKED BY AVERAGE EP<? ; is ' - • 
I n d u s t r i e s with para-
EPC s t a t a l s more pro tec ted 
1. Paper & Packaging 
2. Wood & Furn i ture 
3. Food Process ing 
4. Beverages & Tobacco 
5. Chemicals 
S. T e x t i l e s 
7. C lo th ing , Footwear, e t c 
8. Metal & Metal P r o d u c t s 
9. Non-Me ta l l i c M i n e r a l s 
10. E l e c t r i c a l & T r a n s p o r t Equ: 
. 73 
. 7 3 . 8 6 v . .70 
1. 02 1 . 0 4 v . .98 
114>";"H••!3 : Hi &TIW <*Ur{Kf 
1. 22 1. 47 v . .91 
1 . 3 5 
1 - 4 9 u - . I A tuWtf • !s 
1. 97 
i : -2.12 ..>(#: I'x'•:> . •" J / >J , -:Mf;,,•, j 
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TABLE 7. DISTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENT BY INDUSTRY 
PARASTATALS PRIVATE 
% OF CAPITAL !• '/. OF CAPITAL 
INDUSTRIES WITH NO EFFECTIVE PROTECTION SO. 4 31. 7 
1. Paper & Packag ing 
2. Wood & F u r n i t u r e 
3. Food P r o c e s s i n g 
INDUSTRIES WITH MODERATE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION 29.6 29.7 
4. Beverages & Tobacco 
5. Chemica ls 
6. T e x t i l e s 
HIGHLY PROTECTED INDUSTRIES 10.0 33.6 
7. C l o t h i n g , F o o t w e a r , e t c 
8. Metal & Me ta l P r o d u c t s 
9. N o n - M e t a l l i c M i n e r a l s 
10. E l e c t r i c a l 8. T r a n s p o r t Equip . 
TOTAL PORTFOLIO 100. OV. 100.0'/. 
TOTAL INVESTMENT ( M i l . Shs ) 
number o f f i r m s 
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and Oguttu 's asse r t i on t h a t t h e p a r a s t a t a l s " h a v e done l i t t l e or 
i 
nothing t o push manufac tur ing " i n h e a l t h y •d i rec t ions ' . ' !" Table.!.?" 7 
.1 .. • . : . . -. ; 
does conf irm t h e i r f i n d i n g t h a t p a r a s t a t a l f i r m s t e n d t o be 
l a r g e r : the average s i z e o f t h e c a p i t a l s t o c k o f t h e p a r a s t a t a l s 
i s more than double t h a t o f p r i v a t e f i r m s . B ig need not be 'bad; 
'•('.' • .'• 1 •  , .i•. ' '• • ,,» • iii 'i'o.f . 
i f economies of s ca l e a r e r e a l i z e d and demand i s s u f f i c i e n t , 
' • > • • ••:.••• •-. .-'Djirr • •••• 
large f i rms in Kenya can be q u i t e c o m p e t i t i v e . We saw above; thai 
capacity u t i l i z a t i o n was h i g h e r i n p a r a s t a t a l s than' i n p r i v a t e 0 
f i rms, r e i n f o r c i n g our c o n c l u s i o n t h a t where p a r a s t a t a l s have .v.l. 
invested in l a r g e p lan ts th ey have i n g e n e r a l been j u s t i f i e d . 
Next we re-examine our g e n e r a l i z a t i o n t h a t p a r a s t a L a l s , in 
addi t ion t o being l e s s p r o t e c t e d , a r e a l s o more e f f i c i e n t o;i 
average than p r i v a t e f i r m s . From T a b l e 5 i t can be seen that 
th i s g e n e r a l i z a t i o n of g r e a t e r e f f i c i e n c y ( l o w e r DRC) holds in 
s ix of the ten i n d u s t r i e s . I n T a b l e 8 we rank t h e i n d u s t r i e s by 
DRC from most e f f i c i e n t t o l e a s t , and examine t h e e x c e p t i o n s to 
the ru le . Two of the e x c e p t i o n s a r e f ound in i n d u s t r i e s where 
both paras ta ta l s and p r i v a t e f i r m s a r e q u i t e e f f i c i e n t and the 
means are qu i t e c l o s e t o g e t h e r . Hence, t h e s e two i n d u s t r i e s 
(wood and f u r n i t u r e and c h e m i c a l s ) a r e more c o n s i s t e n t wi th our 
conclusions from Table 4 than w i t h t h e v i ew t h a t p a r a s t a t a l s are 
in genera l i n e f f i c i e n t . T h e r e a r e two i n d u s t r i e s i n which 
paras ta ta l s do seem to p e r f o r m p o o r l y , c l o t h i n g & f o o t w e a r , and 
paper & packaging. Keeping i n mind t h e s e two e x c e p t i o n s , the 
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n that p a r a s t a t a l s a r e more e f f i c i e n t seems t o be 
-44- IDS/WP 4io 
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TABLE 8. INDUSTRIES, RANKED BY AVERAGE DRC •.<- . 
Indus t r i es in which 
PRC Paras ta ta l s l e s s e f f i 
1. Wood & F u r n i t u r e . 95 . 97 v. . 94 
2. Chemica ls ,. 1, 02 43 1. 04 . v. ,99 
3. C l o t h i n g , F o o t w e a r , e t c 1. 02 2. 88 V . 1. 00 
4. Food P r o c e s s i n g 1. 03 .'• j }r 
5. Beverages & Tobacco 1 . 13 
G Paper & Packag ing 1 . 57 1. 69 V . ,84 
7. T e x t i l e s 1. 79 
8. E l e c t r i c a l & T r a n s p o r t Equ ip . 1 . 90 . . ;-1 
9. N o n - M e t a l l i c M i n e r a l s 2. 00 
10. Metal & Me ta l P r o d u c t s 3. 50 , 1. • ' " 
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gene ra l l y supported by t h e d a t a . 
I t might a l so be n o t e d t n a t t h i s g r e a t e r e f f i c i e n c y on the 
part of pa ras ta ta l s i s e s p e c i a l l y n o t i c e a b l e i n t h o s e three 
indus t r i e s which are most h i g h l y p r o t e c t e d and l e a s t e f f i c i e n t 
o v e r a l l . These i n d u s t r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y e l e c t r i c a l and transport 
equipment and metal and meta l p r o d u c t s , a r e ones i n which 
economies of s ca l e ars* i m p o r t a n t and K e n y a ' s market i s smsill 
r e l a t i v e to the minimum e f f i c i e n t s c a l e o f p r o d u c t i o n . I t i s 
h ighly quest ionable whe ther t h e s e a r e w i s e i n v e s t m e n t s f o r Ke'nya, 
but i f i t i s des i red t o d e v e l o p c a p a c i t y i n them, then paras ta ta l 
involvement seems p r e f e r a b l e . 
The argument f o r p a r a s t a t a l i n v o l v e m e n t i s r e l a t e d to 
Hopcraft and Oguttu 's d i s c u s s i o n o f why 'f i rms seek p a r a s t a t a l 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n , but t u r n s t h e i r c o n c l u s i o n ' on i t s head. These 
indus t r i e s depend on h i g h p r o t e c t i o n t o be V i a b l e . P r i v a t e 
inves t o r s w i l l n a t u r a l l y be c a u t i o u s about s i n k i n g . large Sums 
in to immovable p lants which c o u l d be r e n d e r e d c o m p l e t e l y unviable 
at the next budget, shou ld K e n y a ' s f o r e i g n e x change p o s i t i o n 
remain t i g h t . In o rde r t o i n d u c e p r i v a t e i n v e s t m e n t in such 
circumstances i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o o f f e r v e r y h i g h p r o t e c t i o n to 
enable quick recovery o f c a p i t a l . I f t h e r e i s p a r a s t a t a l ' 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n , on the o t h e r hand, i t i s l e s s n e c e s s a r y t o o f f e r 
such extreme inducements. The p a r a s t a t a l C a p i t a l s ierves as W 
so r t of hostage, to c o n v i n c e t h e p r i v a t e p a r t n e r t h a t the 
-46-
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pro tec t i on o f f e r e d now c o u l d no t be w i thdrawn abruptly . Thus 
p r i v a t e f i r m s w i l l be w i l l i n g t o i n v e s t under p ro tec t i on l e v e l s 
which permit normal p r o f i t s and c a p i t a l r e c o v e r y times. The 
process which H o p c r a f t and Ogut tu d e s c r i b e , where the government 
becomes unable t o " d i f f e r e n t i a t e be tween t h e i n t e r e s t s of that 
\ 
f i rm on the one hand, . . . and t h e i n t e r e s t s o f the economy on the 
i 
o ther " makes c r e d i b l e t h i s f o rm o f i n v e s t m e n t guarantee. 
Paras ta ta l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n d u c e s p r i v a t e p a r t i c i p a t i o n with lower 
concessions than would o t h e r w i s e be n e c e s s a r y t o , a t t r a c t 
investment. * . 
F i n a l l y , t h e da ta p r e s e n t e d seem t o c h a l l e n g e the view which 
i s so wide ly h e l d ( though no t by H o p c r a f t and Oguttu) that 
pa ras ta ta l s a r e h i g h l y u n p r o f i t a b l e . I n T a b l e 4 we saw that 
o v e r a l l r a t e s o f p r o f i t a r e n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l between parastatalc; 
and p r i v a t e m a n u f a c t u r i n g ( f i r m s on t h e who l e . From Table 5 i t 
can be seen t h a t p a r a s t a t a l s a r e more p r o f i t a b l e than p r i v a t e 
f i rms xn seven o f t h e t e n i n d u s t r i e s . In t h e three indus t r i es in 
which p a r a s t a t a l s a r e l e s s p r o f i t a b l e than p r i v a t e f i rms , in 
every case t h e p a r a s t a t a l s have l o w e r a v e r a g e r a t e s of e f f e c t i v e 
p ro t e c t i on . In two o f t h e t h r e e i n d u s t r i e s the paras ta ta l s are 
a l so l e s s e f f i c i e n t on a v e r a g e than t h e p r i v a t e f i rms . There id 
no industry where i t can be s a i d t h a t p a r a s t a t a l s are l e s s 
p r o f i t a b l e s o l e l y b e c a u s e o f g r e a t e r i n e f f i c i e n c y , s ince they a r t 
a l so l e s s p r o t e c t e d . 
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So f a r we have compared t h e mean v a l u e s o f t h e v a r i o u s 
measures of performance, but we have no t examined c o r r e l a t i o n s 
\ <-.'.; fit. "-n 3 s. ~J A J-! • • ;-} dVO'i ' 
between the d i f f e r e n t p e r f o r m a n c e i n d i c a t o r s . T h i s can b e s t be 
done using regress ion a n a l y s i s . The r e s u l t s a r e r e p o r t e d in 
•' ' i .« Ti : • ... 
Table 9. 
There i s no reason t o e x p e c t t h a t h i g h e r r a t e s o f e f f e c t i v e 
p ro t ec t i on should be c o r r e l a t e d w i t h h i g h e r p r o f i t a b i l i t y . This 
nOn-re lat ionship has two p o s s i b l e o r i g i n s . A f i r m which, i s 
h ighly protec ted could become i n e f f i c i e n t , e n j o y i n g t h e q u i e t 
! ' • . - . ' v . : . • . .TV.:: 
l i f e which S i r John Hicks s u g g e s t e d was one o f t h e c h i e f rewards 
of monopoly. Even i f e x i s t i n g f i r m s were no t t o d i s s i p a t e t h e i r 
p r o f i t s by becoming i n e f f i c i e n t , r a i s i n g p r o t e c t i o n shou ld induce 
entry u n t i l p r o f i t r a t e s have been d r i v e n down t P nc?rTn3i, l e v e l s . 
I f there are economies o f s c a l e .in t h e i n d u s t r y t h i s w i l l .,.. 
probably mean the indus t ry w i l l be p o p u l a t e d by p l a n t s sma l l e r 
than the minimum e f f i c i e n t s c a l e , o r w i t h low r a t e s o f c a p a c i t y 
u t i l i z a t i o n . Both c o n d i t i o n s w i l l r e s u l t i n low e f f i c i e n c y (high 
DRC). 
The expected lack o f c o r r e l a t i o n be tween p r o t e c t i o n and 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y i s conf i rmed i n e q u a t i o n s one and two i n T a b l e 9. 
For ne i ther paras ta ta l nor f o r p r i v a t e f i r m s i s t h e r e a 
s i g n i f i c a n t c o e f f i c i e n t on EPC, and t h e low RE f o r bo th equat ions 
conf irms the lack of e x p l a n a t o r y power . 
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TABLE 9. RELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE 











Indep . Var . : 
c o n s t a n t 
- . 0 2 2 
( . 0 9 5 ) 
. 053 
( . 0 5 2 ) 
. 726 
( . 3 4 6 ) 
- . 126 
( . 5 2 7 ) 
- . 316 
( . 0 4 9 ) 
240 
< .083 ) 
EPC 
. 147 
( . 0 9 9 ) 
. 068 




( . 1 7 9 ) 
. 138 
( . 0 4 3 ) 
. 171 
< .051 ) 
1 /DRC 
. 324 
( . 099) 
. 166 









p a r a s t a t a l 
p r i v a t e 
p a r a s t a t a l 
p r i v a t e 
p a r a s t a t c i l 
p r i v a t e 
* e q u a t i o n was t r a n s f o r m e d by d i v i d i n g a l l v a r i a b l e s by EPC, i n ord-
t o c o r r e c t f o r h e t e r o s k e d a s t i c i t y 
S tandard e r r o r s a r e r e p o r t e d i n p a r e n t h e s e s . 
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Next , i n e q u a t i o n s t h r e e and f o u r , we c o n f i r m t h a t 
p r o t e c t i o n and i n e f f i c i e n c y do i ndeed come t o g e t h e r . The 
c o n n e c t i o n i s much c l o s e r f o r p r i v a t e f i r m s than f o r p a r a s t a L a i s . 
These e q u a t i o n s show t h a t an i n c r e a s e o f one p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t in 
t h e e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h o n l y 
t h r e e q u a r t e r s o f a p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t i n i n e f f i c i e n c y i n 
p a r a s t a t a l s , but one and a h a l f p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t s i n p r i v a t e 
f i r m s . Fur the rmore , t h e h i g h e r R® f o r p r i v h t e f i r m s C.64 
compared w i t h . 3 9 ) c o n f i r m s t h a t l e v e l o f p r o t e c t i o n i s l e s s 
u s e f u l i n e x p l a i n i n g the p a t t e r n o f e f f i c i e n c y v . i n e f f i c i e n c y in 
p a r a s t a t a l s than in p r i v a t e f i r m s . 
Of c o u r s e , e q u a t i o n s t h r e e and f o u r cannot be i n t e r p r e t e d 
c a u s a l l y ; c a u s a l i t y c o u l d run in e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n . High 
p r o t e c t i o n i n v i t e s i n v e s t m e n t by i n e f f i c i e n t f i r m s , but 
i n e f f i c i e n t f i r m s a r e a l s o l i k e l y t o l obby f o r h i gh p r o t e c t i o n . 
The h i gh R* o f e q u a t i o n f o u r s u g g e s t s t h a t , wh i cheve r d i r e c t i o n 
t h e c a u s a l i t y o p e r a t e s , t h e l i n k i s f a i r l y t i g h t i n t h e p r i v a t e 
s e c t o r . The l owe r Re o f e q u a t i o n t h r e e s u g g e s t s t h a t e i t h e r 
p a r a s t a t a l s a r e not as l i k e l y t o be induced t o i n v e s t by h i gh 
( • i . 
p r o t e c t i o n , o r t h a t i n e f f i c i e n t p a r a s t a t a l s a r e no t as l i k e l y t o 
succeed a t l o b b y i n g f o r p r o t e c t i o n . 
We a l r e a d y saw i n T a b l e 7 above t h a t t h e f i r s t f a c t o r seems 
t o be i n o p e r a t i o n ; p a r a s t a t a l s have c o n c e n t r a t e d t h e i r 
i n v e s t m e n t s i n i n d u s t r i e s w i t h low e f f e c t i v e r a t e s o f p r o t e c t i o n . 
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H o p c r a f t and O g u t t u ' s a s s e r t i o n s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , examples can 
a l s o be found o f t h e second f a c t o r . One such example o c c u r r e d 
r e c e n t l y i n t h e market f o r d i s t i l l e d a l c o h o l i c b e v e r a g e s . The r e 
a r e t h r e e f i r m s i n t h i s i n d u s t r y , two p a r a s t a t a l s and one 
p r i v a t e , a r e c e n t e n t r a n t . Soon a f t e r t h e p r i v a t e f i r m began 
o p e r a t i o n s , t h e M i n i s t e r o f F i n a n c e announced t h a t t h o s e 
d i s t i l l i n g f i r m s which d i d no t h o l d l i c e n s e s f o r r e c t i f y i n g and 
compounding t h e i r p r o d u c t s (an unusual d i s t i n c t i o n which i n c l u d e d 
o n l y t h e p r i v a t e f i r m ) would f a c e s a l e s t a x o f o n l y 20% w h i l e t h e 
o t h e r f i r m s would c o n t i n u e t o pay a s a l e s t a x r a t e o f 50"/.. 9 That 
government p o l i c i e s shou ld d i s c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t p a r a s t a t a l s may 
a t f i r s t seem s u r p r i s i n g . However , on second t h o u g h t i t may not 
be so s u r p r i s i n g . Lobby ing i s a c o s t l y b u s i n e s s , i t t e rms o f 
t i m e and pe rhaps a l s o o f b r i b e s . P a r a s t a t a l managers d o n ' t have 
t h e i r own f i n a n c i a l f u t u r e s a t s t a k e i n t h e same way as p r i v a t e 
e n t r e p r e n e u r s , so i t may be u n d e r s t a n d a b l e i f t h e i r l o b b y i n g were 
l e s s p e r s i s t e n t o r l e s s e f f e c t i v e . H o p c r a f t and Ogut tu were 
c l e a r l y wrong i n t h e i r a s s e r t i o n t h a t p a r a s t a t a l i n v o l v e m e n t , 
ensured " t h a t t h e f i r m i n v o l v e d w i l l be on t h e r i g h t s i d e o f t h e 
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y s e r i e s o f measures t h a t gove rnment uses t o p romote 
m a n u f a c l u r i n g . H 
I : i. K • ' • " 
Summary o f D F I s ' r o l e i n m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
Manu fa c tu r i ng p a r a a t a t a l e have been p o p u l a r s u b j e c t s o f 
c r i t i c i s m . We have used H o p c r a f t and Ogut tu as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
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o f t h e common v i ew t h a t t h e DFIs have encouraged p r o t e c t i o n as 
w e l l as i n v e s t i n g in f i r m s which a r e i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y l^trge and 
c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e . Much o f t h e c r i t i c i s m q>f t h e DFIs has been 
based on s c a n t y e v i d e n c e . Based on an i m p o r t a n t new da ta s o u r c e . 
we have come t o v e r y d i f f e r e n t c o n c l u s i o n s on t h e r o l e o f 
• > • ' 1 
p a r a s t a t a l s i n m a n u f a c t u r i n g . 
We have found t h a t on a v e r a g e p a r a s t a t a l s a r e somewhat 
p r o t e c t e d and i n e f f i c i e n t , but t h a t t h e l e v e l s o f e f f e c t i v e 
p r o t e c t i o n and i n e f f i c i e n c y a r e l e s s than t h o s e o f t h e p r i v a t e 
f i r m s i n t h e sample . We found t h a t t h e s e c o n c l u s i o n s h e l d , w i th 
a f ew e x c e p t i o n s , w i t h i n i n d u s t r i e s as w e l l as o v e r a l l . We f ound 
' i, . >•(•... .; i|T.r. JJ.uyi" " i 
t h a t p a r a s t a t a l s have a l l o c a t e d o v e r t w i c e as much o f t h e i r 
i n v e s t m e n t p o r t f o l i o t o i n d u s t r i e s which a r e u n p r o t e c t e d as has 
the p r i v a t e s e c t o r . The sha r e o f t h e i r p o r t f o l i o i n h i g h l y 
p r o t e c t e d i n d u s t r i e s i s o n l y about one q u a r t e r t h a t o f p r i v a t e 
f i r m s . In t h e s e h i g h l y p r o t e c t e d s e c t o r s p a r a s t a t a l e f f i c i e n c y 
has been f a r b e t t e r than p r i v a t e f i r m s ' , s u g g e s t i n g t h a t ; 
p a r a s t a t a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n j o i n t v e n t u r e s i s a v a l u a b l e t o o l i n 
i n d u s t r i a l s t r a t e g y . We have seen t h a t p a r a s t a t a l s a r e , l e s s 
l i k e l y t o r espond t o h i gh p r o t e c t i o n by becoming i n e f f i c i e n t , and : • r, i • . i, : i', ".'-• • ' " •• 1 Tl- •• • 7 : i. 
l e s s l i k e l y t o e f f e c t i v e l y seek p r o t e c t i o n when they a r e 
i n e f f i c i e n t . T h e i r o v e r a l l p r o f i t r a t e s a r e q u i t e s i m i l a r t o • . : ! ; ..!• '2 I • • • Ml/ • 1 lie. • •:••,..!• < ' ••<:'• 
p r o f i t r a t e s o f 
p r i v a t e manu fa c tu r e r s , but t h e s e p r o f i t s a r e 
ea rned by g r e a t e r a v e r a q e e f f i c i e n c y and l o w e r a v e r a g e e f f e c t i v e 
p r o t e c t i o n . 
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The i n f o r m a t i o n p r e s e n t e d h e r e l e a v e s unanswered the 
quest ion of why t h e DFI s u b s i d i a r i e s seem to perform be t t e r than 
the p r i v a t e s e c t o r . T h e r e a r e a t l e a s t t h r e e poss ib l e f a c t o r s 
which could be a t work. F i r s t , t h e DFIs may simply be be t t e r at 
i d e n t i f y i n g v i a b l e i n v e s t m e n t s which can func t i on with l e s s 
p ro t ec t i on . S i n c e t h i s i s one o f t h e i r e x p l i c i t r o l e s , t h i s i s 
not an i m p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n . 
•  . • . ' .••: I. • • • ':%{ •• 
Second, i t may be t h a t t h e DFIs p l a y a p o s i t i v e r o l e in 
management o f t h e i r s u b s i d i a r i e s . They p r o v i d e management advice 
and consu l t i ng , s i t on boa rds o f d i r e c t o r s , help r e c r u i t and 
s e l e c t managers, e t c . They a l s o g e t i n v o l v e d in rescue 
operat ions when f i r m s g e t i n t o t r o u b l e . To the extent that these 
s e r v i c e s are e f f e c t i v e , t h ey would l e a d t o b e t t e r performance by 
DFI s u b s i d i a r i e s , compared w i t h p r i v a t e f i r m s , e s p e c i a l l y those 
owned by l o c a l e n t r e p r e n e u r s , who may have no ready source of 
such a s s i s t a n c e . 
•i • i • >'• :> a :• . 
....... i ' . . . , . , • 
F i n a l l y , H o p c r a f t has emphas i z ed t h e r o l e of DFIs i s serv ing 
as advocates f o r t h e i r s u b s i d i a r i e s i n government f o r a . We have 
seen from the da ta t h a t i t a p p e a r s t h e y have not succeeded in 
• * 1 1 ' t . • ' .. . "1 ; ' i . . • * . i •. 
winning d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n f a v o r o f ways t h a t show up in the EPC. 
(Things which a f f e c t EPC i n c l u d e t h i n g s which a f f e c t p r i ces , such 
« . I v . I _ • I . 
as t a r i f f s , p r i c e c o n t r o l s , t a x e s , i m p o r t bans, e t c . ) However, 
there are a who l e s e t o f ways i n which DFIs could serve as 
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e f f e c t i v e advocates, which, would not a f f e c t EPC- Examples 
include securing t imely p r o c e s s i n g o f e x p o r t c ompensa t i on c la ims, 
f o r e i g n exchange a l l o c a t i o n s , i m p o r t l i c e n s e s , e t c . I f DFI 
subs id i a r i e s r e c e i v e , b e t t e r t r e a t m e n t a t t h e hands o f government 
agencies, i t would c o n t r i b u t e t o h i g h e r e f f i c i e n c y and h i ghe r 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y f o r the DFI s u b s i d i a r i e s . 
A l l of these p o s s i b i l i t i e s r e p r e s e n t a p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n 
of DFIs. Further research w i l l be r e q u i r e d t o d i s t i n g u i s h which 
explanat ions seem more dominant. 
• ' ' • • < • • • • •. • i 
V. Conclusions. , ,. , ( , 
The eva luat ion of the DFIs p r e s e n t e d h e r e h^ts been f a r from 
complete. The i r primary m i s s i o n . i s t o f o s t e r d e v e l opmen t i n the 
p r i v a t e s ec to r , so a comple te e v a l u a t i o n would need t o examine 
the record of the f i rms they have a s s i s t e d . The DFIs have not 
repor ted such data, and i t has o n l y been p o s s i b l e h e r e t o examine 
the record in manufacturing. Fur the rmore , s i n c e i t i s no t 
poss ib l e f o s p e c i f y t h e i r o u t p u t , i t has a l s o been d i f f i c u l t to 
discuss t h e i r e f f i c i e n c y . 
Nonetheless, c e r t a in c o n c l u s i o n s emerge . The t h r e e DFIs 
which s p e c i a l i z e in manufactur ing < ICDC, ID£.,. and D^CK) appear t o 
have performed f a i r l y w e l l . Jhe,y isej?m t o have f o s t e r e d hea l thy 
growth in the manufacturing s e c t o r i n s p f a r as t h e i r s u b s i d i a r i e s 
have been more e f f i c i e n t on a,verage and, have f u n c t i o n e d , w i t h l e s s 
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pro t ec t i on^ on a v e r a g e than have manufac tur ing f i rms which are 
purely p r i v a t e . We c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e s e DFIs have made an 
important c o n t r i b u t i o n t o d e v e l o p m e n t i n t h e i r s ec to r . These 
f i rms seem t o have o f f e r e d t h e i r s u b s i d i a r i e s near-commercial 
terms on t h e i r l o n g - t e r m f i n a n c e ( w i t h t h e except ion of IDB 
equi ty h o l d i n g s ) , which has no doubt c o n t r i b u t e d t o a l l o c a t i n g 
resources t o e c o n o m i c a l l y and c o m m e r c i a l l y v i a b l e en t e rp r i s es . 
Desp i t e t h e i r s u b s t a n t i a l a c h i e v e m e n t s , these three f i rms 
have made numerous poo r i n v e s t m e n t s , which has depressed t h e i r 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y t o modest p o s i t i v e l e v e l s . The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
these poor i n v e s t m e n t s may w e l l l i e l a r g e l y with the government 
ra ther than t h e DFIs . The f i r m s seem t o have had good cost 
con t ro l , a t l e a s t up u n t i l t h e l a t e 7 0 ' s when cos ts began t o 
increase . O ther f a c t o r s than g r o w i n g i n e f f i c i e n c y may expla in 
part or a l l o f t h e r e p o r t e d i n c r e a s e , but i t i s not poss ib l e to 
say how much. 
The o t h e r two h o l d i n g compan ies (ADC and KTDC) have 
performed q u i t e d i f f e r e n t l y . They have inves t ed t h e i r c a p i t a l on 
h igh ly c o n c e s s i o n a r y t e rms and ea rned v e r y poor (even nega t i ve in 
the case o f KTDC) r a t e s o f r e t u r n . T h e i r cos t s have been 
c o n s i s t e n t l y h i g h e r than t h o s e o f t h e manufacturing group. No 
data has been p r e s e n t e d on t h e s u c c e s s o f the ventures they havp 
aided. The poo r f i n a n c i a l r e t u r n s t h e y have r ece i v ed from t h e i r 
s u b s i d i a r i e s p r o b a b l y i n d i c a t e poor a v e r a g e performance. The 
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A D C ' E farming operat ions seem t o have been an e x c e p t i o n . The 
poor returns of the KTDC a r e hard t o a c c e p t - - t h e t o u r i s m s e c t o r 
as a whole has been highly p r o f i t a b l e and KTDC seems no t t o have 
been able t o take advantage o f an a t t r a c t i v e e n v i r o n m e n t . 
The record presented h e r e f o r t h e KNTC, KIE and NCC has been 
very incomplete. A l l we have been a b l e t o say about KNTC i s that 
i t has been moderately p r o f i t a b l e . C o n s i d e r i n g i t has a monopoly 
on the goods in which i t t r a d e s , t h i s i s no t s u r p r i s i n g , and 
cannot be taken as an i n d i c a t o r o f good p e r f o r m a n c e . I t i s c l e a r 
that some A f r i c a n i z a t i o n o f r e t a i l and w h o l e s a l e t r a d e has 
occurred s ince KNTC began, but p e r s i s t e n t g rumb l ing s u g g e s t s that 
many remain d i s s a t i s f i e d w i th t h e p r o g r e s s . 
KIE and NCC have not been p r o f i t a b l e - - t h e n a t u r e o f t h e i r 
business would make i t s u r p r i s i n g i f they were . We have not been 
able t o assess t h e i r e f f i c i e n c y , o r t h e d e g r e e t o which t h e 
en t e rp r i s e s they have a ided have succe eded . C l e a r l y some KIE 
aided en t e rp r i s e s do succeed (Mushl , 1983 ) . But t h e o v e r a l l 
record remains unclear. No d a t a i s a v a i l a b l e on t h e s u c c e s s of 
A f r i can entrepreneurs at p e n e t r a t i n g t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n s e c t o r . 
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